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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
S. W. DOWSE and PEARL DOWSE,
his wife, JAY E. TREADWAY and
MARION MAVE TREADWAY, his
wife, and A. C. WHITAKER,

Case No,
7949

Defendants and Appellants,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

This is a case in which the District Court set aside an
execution sale and sheriff's deed issued to appellant
Dowse, a deed from appellant Dowse to appellants Treadway, and a mortgage to appellant A. C. Whitaker. The
deed and mortgage covered a part of the property involved in this action. The sheriff's deed, the deed to
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Treadways and the mortgage to Whitaker were vacated
because the sheriff's sale was made upon a satisfied
judgment and neither Treadway nor Whitaker were innocent purchasers. The trial court also found the execution sale was for a grossly inadequate price, that the
sale was attended by fraud, conspiracy, irregularities,
and that it was unfair. The court rendered a money
judgment against appellant Dowse for rents and profits
received from the properties sold at execution and for
slander of title.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent accepts the statement of facts as
set forth by appellant Dowse with the following
additions and amplifications:
A cost judgment was entered by Dowse in Civil
Case No. 86,895 (Ex. 1) in violation of an unaorstanding
between respondent's attorney, Milton V. Backman, and
LaMar Duncan, attorney for Dowse. In line with this
understanding Mr. Backman paid no heed to the provisions of the Findings and Decree providing for costs
in case No. 86,895, and the cost bill did not come to his
personal attention when served on his office, (R 91).
Subsequent to the entry of the cost judgment, Mr.
Duncan approached Mr. Backman for the purpose of
working out an arrangement for terminating respondent's right of appeal and settling the differences
existing between the parties in case No. 86,895 (R 63,
64, 65, 67, 68 & 180) (Finding No. 7). An understanding
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was reached, Mr. Dowse agreeing to give Mr. Pender
$100.00 for a quit-claim deed to the property, the subject
of litigation in case No. 86,895. The $100.00 was paid
and the deed was delivered by respondent to appellant
on January 29, 1949, (E 65, 189) (Ex. J ) . Nothing
was said about the cost judgment during the negotiations, nor at the time of the payment of the $100.00 for
the delivery of the deed (E 189). Mr. Duncan, Dowse's
attorney, who personally delivered the $100.00 in
consideration of the delivery of the deed, made no
demand for payment of the $22.80 cost judgment, nor
did he claim a right to withhold the sum of $22.80 to
satisfy the cost judgment (E 189, 190).
The execution dated January 9, 1949 was
delivered to the sheriff for service until January
1951, when Mr, Duncan delivered it to the sheriff
gether with the Praecipe (E. 137, 139.) (Ex. H,

not
31,
toX).

The praecipe directed the sheriff to levy upon the
property in question together with the other real
property, the latter property referred to being struck
from the sale when Mr. Bleak, the deputy sheriff,
informed Mr. Duncan there was a question as to the
ownership (E 138).
The date the execution and praecipe issued and
at the time of the levy and sale appellant Dowse had
in his possession personal property belonging to Mr.
Pender of a value of more than sufficient to satisfy the
judgment, (E. 108, 136, Finding No. 10).
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Prior to the sale and the issuance of the sheriff's
deed the respondent had had many business transactions
with appellant Dowse and respondent had consummated the deals by checks drawn on the First Security
Bank of Utah (E. 104, 105) (Ex. N), the last check being
dated June 17, 1949. Eespondent had bank accounts
in three Salt Lake City banks, viz: $1,000.00 in the
Continental National Bank; $100.00 in First Security
Bank of Utah, N. A. and $500 in Walker Bank & Trust
Company (E. 105,106,115).
Prior to the delivery of the praecipe appellant told
Mr. Duncan, his attorney, that respondent had kept
accounts in several Salt Lake City banks (E 185).
The respondent owned an automobile in which
appellant Dowse had ridden several times (E. 106),
and both appellant and his attorney knew respondent
owned such (E. 106).
Situated on part of the property levied upon, (not
the property mortgaged or deeded to appellants Treadway and Whitaker) was a garage containing war surplus materials. In addition there was visible on the
property, a walk-in refrigerator and a large stack of
automobile mufflers. The mufflers were contained in
boxes stacked 15 feet high, 75 feet long and 18 feet wide
(E. I l l , 112, 120 and 121). This personal property had
stood on the property levied upon since 1948 or 1949, and
several of the following signs were tacked thereon:
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"FOR SALE
Call or Write
R. PENDER, Owner
672 Milton Ave.
Phone 6-2346"
(R. 121, 122). The sign was approximately 13" x
20" (R. 112, 113, 121) (Ex. Q). The signs could be seen
from Richards Street and also at South Temple and
13th South Streets (R. 112, 113, 123). This personal
property was at all times in full view (R 114, 115).
The respondent valued this personal property at
from $1,000.00 to $2,000.00. Another witness, Mr.
Larch, valued it at execution from $2,000.00 to $5,000.00
(R 113, 125). Appellants did not question the value
placed thereon. Exhibits R, S, T, U, V, and O are
pictures of the personal property situated on the real
property aforementioned.
Prior to the execution and issuance of the praecipe,
the levy and sale, appellant Dowse examined the
property, the subject of this action, and saw the personal
property located thereon, (R 129, 130 and 131). Appellant knew it belonged to respondent. Respondent had
taken appellant to the property and had shown it to
him (R. 134). Mr. Duncan also knew of the personal
property on the premises as he examined the property
prior to the issuance of the praecipe and prior to the
sale (R. 183,197,198).
Appellant Dowse never told the sheriff or his deputies that the respondent owned personal property (R.
131).
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No attempt was made by Dowse to collect the
judgment by garnishment proceedings (R 131, 190).
Neither did Dowse examine respondent on supplemental
proceedings (R. 132).
The property sold consisted of four non-contiguous
tracts of land situated in North Columbia Subdivision,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, of the fair market
value at the date of the execution sale as hereinafter
mentioned and subject to the following encumbrances:
Lots 2, 3 and 4, Block 8—Value $6,000.00, less
Freeman judgment of $13.20 and a tax sale of
$171.86, or a net value of $5,814.94 (R 78, 79)
(Ex. F ) .
Lots 2 and 3, Block 4—Value $1,080.00, less the
same Freeman judgment of $13.20, or a net value
of $1,066.81 (R 81, Ex. D).
Lots 6 and 7, Block 4—Value $875.00, less the
same Freeman judgment of $13.20; special tax
sale for paving extension of $35.15, costs and
interest; tax sale to Salt Lake County for the
years 1929 to 1935, approximately $240.00 plus
interest and costs. A tax deed had issued to Salt
Lake County, net value of approximately $606.65.
^ v (R 80, Ex. E ) .
Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block 6—Value $900.00, less
the same Freeman judgment of $13.20, or a net
value of $886.80 (R 81, 82. Ex. B).
Lots 13 to 21, Block 8, are contiguous to Lots 1,
19 and 20, Block 6. Title to Lots 13 to 21, Block
8, had been quieted subject to respondent paying
Carl Morandi the sum of $3,086.44 ( E x / C ) .
These lots were valued at $12.00 per foot. A
total value of this tract of land was $3600.00 less
the Morandi claim in the sum of $3,086.44. The
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Morandi claim however included other p r o p e r t y - f ^ ^ Q not covered by this action.
Appellant Mr. Dowse, a real estate broker for 24
years, did not question the foregoing values. Neither
did appellants Treadway or Whitaker show that the
property was of a lesser value.
No demand was made by appellant Dowse or his
attorney Mr. Duncan for the payment of the judgment
(K 189), nor did they advise the respondent or his
attorney that the property was being levied upon and
was being sold or that it had been sold. This was true
notwithstanding the fact that the respondent and the
appellant Dowse and their attorneys are all residents
of Salt Lake City, Utah, and Mr. Dowse and the
respondent had business dealings together, both before
"l and after the entry of the judgment, Dowse was respondent's broker (R. 34), and Mr. Duncan and Mr. Backman had met each other several times on the street
(R 67). Mr. Duncan explained his failure to notify Mr.
Backman or to make a demand for the payment of the
judgment was because he was angry with Mr. Backman
as Mr. Backman would not get him a quit-claim deed
without cost (R, 189).
Mr. Dowse and Mr. Duncan directed the sheriff
to levy on the respondent's real property, knowing that
there was personal property from which any valid judgment could be satisfied.
The sheriff made no effort to locate and sell
respondent's non-exempt personal property (R 141),
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and this notwithstanding as heretofore shown, personal
property belonging to respondent was situated on the
property upon which Mr. Bleak, the deputy sheriff, posted a notice (B. 143), and signs indicating ownership in
the respondent were attached to the property (E. 121).
The real property, the subject of this action, worth
approximately $8,000.00 exclusive of taxes and other
liens was sold to the appellant Dowse at execution sale
for $47.46 (Ex. I).
Neither respondent or his attorney, Mr. Backman,
had actual knowledge of the levy, the sale or the
sheriff's deed until after the deed had been issued (E 67,
68, 52) (Finding No. 14).
Eespondent paid the Morandi claim of $3086.44 (E.
174).
Eespondent alleged in his amended complaint
that he did not tender the amount of the judgment,
interest and costs and the costs incurred by reason of
the sheriff's sale for the reason that the sale was unlawful as it was upon a satisfied judgment, however, he
offered to pay such amount provided the court should
find that the judgment had not been satisfied (E 28).
STATEMENT OF FACTS AS THEY APPLY
TO APPELLANTS TEEADWAY
Eespondent accepts the statement of facts of the
appellants Treadway with the following additions and
amplifications:
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The certificate of sale and the sheriff's deed were of
record in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake
County prior to the sale to Treadways. Each of said
instruments recited the purchase price for the whole
of the property acquired by appellant Dowse at sheriff's
sale of $47.46. The abstract contained the execution, the
certificate of sale and the sheriff's deed (Ex. 4).
Counsel for Treadways, being concerned about the
regularity of the sheriff's sale, made inquiry of Mr. Duncan, attorney for appellant Dowse regarding the proceedings. Thereafter appellant Dowse delivered a special
warranty deed to Treadways and not a general warranty
deed which Dowse had agreed to deliver to Treadways.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AS THEY APPLY
TO APPELLANT WHITAKER
The respondent accepts the statement of facts as
outlined in brief of appellant Whitaker, with the exceptions, additions and amplifications herein noted.
Appellant Whitaker's testimony to the effect that in
accepting a mortgage he did so in reliance on a title insurance policy was admitted by the court for the sole
purpose of showing that he did not have actual knowledge
of the execution, sheriff's certificate of sale and deed
(R. 160).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
Appellants Whitaker and Dowse had been friends
for 25 years; they officed within seven or eight doors of
each other and Dowse visited with Whitaker at Whitaker 's place of business once or more each week (E. 162,
165).
Whitaker's mortgage covered only three of the 19
lots sold to Dowse at sheriff's sale, he did not inspect the
property prior to the execution of the mortgage, however, he said he knew of it and that Dowse had described
its location to him (E. 166).
Prior to the execution of the mortgage Whitaker
had taken property in his name for the benefit of himself
and Dowse and at the time of the execution of the mortgage and the date of its foreclosure, Dowse and Whitaker
were the co-owners of four tracts of land (E. 163, 167,
168).
Some time prior to the mortgage transaction, Dowse
had shown Whitaker a $10,000.00 title policy covering
the 19 lots in question and Whitaker asked for a title
insurance policy to the three lots covered by the mortgage (E. 170,171, Ex. 9).
The $5,000.00 promissory note was payable two years
after date with interest payable semi-annually. Dowse
defaulted in the payment of the first two semi-annual
interest payments and yet no demand was made for payment of either of them until March, 1952, which was after
the commencement of this action. Thereafter Whitaker
foreclosed the mortgage (E. 160).
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PRETRIAL ORDER
The appellant Dowse set forth part of the pretrial
order only. In addition to his statement the following
amendment should be included: (R 47 and 54)
"On motion of counsellor plaintiff and good
cause appearing, the pretrial order heretofore
entered in this case is amended by adding as
ISSUES OF LAW the following:
1. May a court of equity set aside the
Sheriff's Deed affecting the property in question
and impose a trust on the property in favor of
plaintiff.
2. Are the defendants Treadway innocent
purchasers for value or did they take subject to
any right, title or interest plaintiff has in the
property.
3. Was the defendant Whittaker an innocent mortgagee for value or did he take subject
to plaintiff's title.
4. Provided the court should find that
defendants Treadway are innocent purchasers for
value, is plaintiff entitled to judgment against
defendant S. W. Dowse for the sum- of $1000.00
paid by Treadways for a portion of said property
or its fair market value.
5. Provided the court should find that
defendant Whittaker's mortgage is not subject
to plaintiff's title, is the plaintiff entitled to
judgment against S. W. Dowse in the amount
represented by the lien of the mortgage.
6. Is plaintiff entitled to damages against
S. W. Dowse for slander of title and if so in what
amount."
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ARGUMENT
A SUIT IN EQUITY TO SET ASIDE AN
EXECUTION SALE AND SHERIFF'S DEED PURSUANT THERETO AND THE DEED OF INTEEVENING THIED PAETIES IS PEOPEE AND MAY
BE MAINTAINED AND A JUDGMENT DEBTOE
NEED NOT PROCEED IN THE OEIGINAL ACTION
OUT OF WHICH THE SALE AROSE WHERE
SHEEIFF'S DEED HAS ISSUED OE THE PEOPEETY IS DEEDED OE MOETGAGED TO OTHEES
OE WHEEE THE SALE IS ATTENDED WITH
FEAUD, OE AN ACCOUNTING IS NECESSARY
TO ADJUST THE EIGHTS OF THE PAETIES.
The Appellants contend that the Respondent's
action does not lie in equity that he should have proceeded in the original action out of which the execution,
sale and sheriff's deed resulted. He characterizes
respondent's suit in equity as a collateral attack. In
no respect is their position correct. The Courts uniformly hold where a sheriff's deed has issued, or the
rights of a third party intervened, or an accounting is
necessary to adjust the rights of the parties, or the sale
is attended with fraud that the proper remedy is by
a suit in equity, the remedy at law is inadequate, the
law Court not having the authority to vacate or set
aside the sheriff's deed or the deeds of third parties or
render an accounting and a suit in equity is proper and
is a direct attack upon the sale and deeds and not
collateral.
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Not one, but all of the elements conferring equity
jurisdiction are present here. The sheriff's deed had
issued, there are intervening third parties, the sale was
attended with fraud and an accounting of rents, profits
and taxes was necessary.
"A bill in equity, however, may be maintained for this purpose where proper grounds
for equity jurisdiction exist, and where the
remedy at law by motion to vacate the sale, or
by ejectment or defense thereto, is inadequate.
Thus a bill in equity is the proper remedy where
the questions involved are such that they cannot
be as satisfactorily investigated on the hearing
of the motion as on the trial of a suit in equity,
as in cases where it may be necessary to execute
long delay in attacking the sale, or where there
may be one who may possibly claim to be an
innocent purchaser; or where the purchaser has
rightfully paid out considerable sums which
should be refunded or secured to him if the sale
is vacated; or where the property has been conveyed by the purchaser at the sale to a third
person; or where the purchaser is not a party
to the action; or after the time for a motion has
expired.
"Before or after execution of deed. While
as shown supra pp. 238 b, there are decisions
authorizing a motion to set aside the sale after
the execution of a sheriff's deed; it is generally
held that equity has exclusive jurisdiction of a
bill to set aside a sale where the sale has been
followed by a deed from the sheriff, since a court
of law is incompetent to decree the cancellation
of such deed and thus remove the cloud it casts
on the title, * * *." 33 CJS page 500 Sec. 239 (a).
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The Court in DUNN v. PONCELEK, 178 So. 40,
235 Ala. 269, held that all a law court out of which the
execution issued could do was to vacate the sale, it had
no authority to cancel the sheriff's deed. The remedy
at law was inadequate and a suit in equity would lie.
The Court said:
"Where, therefore, there has been a sale of
property under judicial process and a deed has
been issued to the purchaser, and the circumstances attending the sale are such as render the
sale voidable at the election of the execution
defendant, a Court of equity will entertain a bill
to vacate the sale and cancel the deed as a cloud
upon the debtor's title."
In STKONG v. TEDDEK, 196 S. 829, 143 Fla. 473,
the Court held that a motion to vacate a sheriff's deed
cannot be addressed to a common law court from whence
it issued as the common law court would not have
authority to cancel the deed, that the remedy at law was
inadequate and resort must be had in equity.
In Young v. Schroeder, 10 U. 155, 37 P. 252,
affirmed 16 S. Ct. 512, 116 U.S. 334, 40 L. Ed. 721, the
court in an equity action vacated sheriff's deeds and the
Supreme Court of the United States in discussing equity
jurisdiction, said :
"Probably, if a motion had been made in
the original case to set aside the sale upon the
ground of mere irregularities, such motion would
have to be made before the statutory period for
redemption had passed; but in this class of cases,
where fraudulent conduct is imputed to the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
parties conducting the sale, there is a concurrent
jurisdiction of a court of equity, founded upon
its general right to relieve from the consequences
of fraud, accident, or mistake, which may be
exercised, notwithstanding the statutory period
for redemption has expired. It is evident that,
where a sale has culminated in the execution and
delivery of a deed to the purchaser, which is not
void upon its face, or a mortgage has been put
upon the property, as in this case, no remedy is
complete which does not go to the cancellation of
such deed, and the complete reinvestment of the
title in the plaintiff. It also appears from the
findings that appellant has received rents from
the property, that various sums had been expended for taxes and other purposes, that an
accounting was necessary in adjusting the rights
of the parties, which could not be effectually
carried on in a court of law. There can be no
doubt of the jurisdiction of a court of equity in
such case notwithstanding the expiration of the
statutory time of redemption."
To the same effect see DRAGOON MARBLE AND
MINING COMPANY v. McNEISH, 235 Pac. 401, 28
Ariz. 96; JENKINS v. MERRIWEATHER, 109 111.
647; SCHANTZ v. CLEMMER, et al, 50 A. (2) 289.
The foregoing decisions not only establish that a
suit to set aside sheriff's deed in equity is a proper
remedy but they recognize that such is a direct and not
a collateral attack.
In Thomas v. Thomas, 44 Mont. 102, 119 Pac. 283,
the purchaser after receiving the sheriff's deed petitioned the court by way of a writ of assistance to be put
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in possession. The appellant resisted on the ground
that the sale was irregular. He did not seek to vacate
the deed. The court said :
"At most, the failure to sell separately is a
mere irregularity, which may or may not result
in prejudice to the defendant. / / he deems himself aggrieved, he may move to have the sale set
aside and the property resold, or he may proceed
by bill in equity. Either method would constitute
a direct attach upon the sale. But he ought not
to be permitted to remain silent and inactive
until demand is made for possession, and then
resist such demand by collateral attack upon the
proceedings leading up to the sale." (Itallics
added)
See also 33 C.J.S. Sec. 242, p. 507. Home Owners Loan
Corp. v. Braxton, 44 N.E. (2) 989.
THE EXECUTION AND DELIVERY BY PENDER TO DOWSE OF THE QUIT CLAIM DEED
DATED JULY 22, 1949, EFFECTED A SATISFACTION AND DISCHARGE OF THE JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN CASE No. 86,895 AND THE EXECUTION AND SALE WAS ON A SATISFIED JUDGMENT.
The Respondent alleged and the trial court found
that the execution and sale was made upon a satisfied
judgment. By Finding of Fact No. 7 (R, 241), the
Court found:
"7. That on November 29, 1949, the said
n
Rennold Pender, upon the solicitation and request
A of S. W. Dowse and in consideration of the payment by S. W. Dowse to Rennold Pender of
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$100.00, executed and delivered to the said S. W.
Dowse a Quit Claim Deed to the property involved in Civil Action No. 86,895. That it was
agreed between the said S. W. Dowse and Kennold Pender that said transaction was to settle X
all differences arising in and out of said case,
Civil No. 86,895, and to terminate the said
Kennold Pender's right of appeal from the judgment entered therein."
and the Court's Conclusion of Law said:
"1. That the execution and delivery of the
quit claim deed by Eennold Pender, plaintiff, to
defendant S. W. Dowse, affecting property, the
subject of action, Civil No. 86,895, constituted a
full and complete settlement of said case for all
intents and purposes, and a satisfaction of the
judgment in said action and plaintiff was entitled
to have the judgment out of which execution and
levy and sale of the property herein affected
satisfied. That defendant S. W. Dowse is
estopped from denying otherwise."
The evidence supports the finding. The Court was
entitled to draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence and we believe in light of the evidence that the
finding is clearly supported.
It is undisputed that after the entry of the judgment upon which the execution issued and the sale was
made Mr. Duncan attorney for Dowse approached Mr.
Backman, attorney for Pender, for the purpose of
negotiating an arrangement by which Kespondent's
appeal time in Civil Case No. 86,895 could be terminated.
An arrangement was worked out and Mr. Dowse paid
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Mr. Pender the sum of $100.00 to terminate Pender's
right of appeal and Pender executed and delivered a
quit claim deed. The dispute here is whether the
delivery of the deed by Respondent was intended as a
settlement of the differences of the parties and a satisfaction of the judgment entered. Although no mention
was made of the cost judgment during negotiations the
arrangements arrived at were all had after the entry of
the cost judgment and Respondent's right of appeal
lay from both the judgment quieting title and the cost
judgment. His right of appeal was from the judgment
quieting title, which included costs. When respondent
ana Dowse, through their counsel, reached an agreement terminating respondent's right of appeal it ef*y fected a settlement of all of the phases of the action and
resulted in a settlement of the differences of the parties
and a satisfaction of the judgment. This intent is further
borne out by the fact that Mr. Duncan did not nor did he
claim the right to deduct $22.80 from the $100.00 in satisfaction of the costs. Certainly no other finding could
A have been reached from the evidence.
It is most difficult to follow appellant's argument
that a deed given to cut off an appeal period as is conceded by appellant is not a settlement of the case as to
that part of the judgment assessing costs. Appellant
says: "The quit claim deed mentioned in said finding
was to terminate Pender's right of appeal from the judgment against him in said case and not satisfy the judgment for costs against him," we are unable to conceive
of one part of a judgment being satisfied without the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
other. How can it be said that only the judgment quieting title was satisfied, inasmuch as respondent's right of
appeal was from the judgment quieting title which included the cost judgment, it is one judgment.
There is an abundance of evidence supporting the
court's finding on this point. However, even if there was
no evidence the court would not be in error in finding
as it did, this being an equity case the court had a right
to invoke the maxim equity regards as done what ought
to be done.
As to the date of the deed delivered by respondent
to appellant that is of no consequence, Backman
explained that the deed had been made out previous to
the time of delivery to be used in a deal with a Mr. ^
Steiner which deal was never consumated. (R 92).
Appellant accepted the benefits of the act and has
made no offer to place the parties in status quo.
(1 Am. Jur. 220)
Assuming for the purpose of argument that the cost
judgment was not satisfied, had appellant intended to
press payment on his cost judgment it was his duty to do
so at the time he was paying over monies to respondent
against whom he held the judgment, then appellant had
monies under his control, belonging to respondent out of
which the judgment could have been satisfied, it is clearly
evident that appellant was not desirous of effecting satisfaction of the judgment, but appellant saw an opportunity
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to grab thousands of dollars worth of property for little
or nothing.
Appellant treated the judgment as wholly satisfied in
passing title to the property described in the deed to a
third party, otherwise that property which appellant
conveyed to his grantee would have been clouded with
the lien of the cost judgment.
We agree with the statement of appellant that it
is from the evidence that the intent of the parties must
be determined and the court found on such evidence.
^ Nothing could be so far from the truth that it was not
the intention of the parties to make a complete and full
settlement of the case in which the cost judgment was
entered. Even if this were not the fact appellant Dowse
is estopped to deny otherwise.
AN EXECUTION SALE AND SHERIFF'S
DEED WILL BE SET ASIDE FOR GROSS INADEQUACY OF PRICE I F SO GREAT AS TO SHOCK
THE UNDERSTANDING OR THE CONSCIENCE
OR AS TO AMOUNT TO FRAUD, UNFAIRNESS
OR OPPRESSION.
We believe that the sale was on a satisfied judgment
and of necessity void. However, we now pass to a consideration of the effect of the sheriff's sale.
As it is questionable whether the Court in National
Realty Sales Company v. Ewing, 55 U. 438, 186 P. 1103,
intended to lay down the rule that gross inadequacy of
consideration was not sufficient grounds to set aside a
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sheriff's sale or deed, we present this question to the
Court for its consideration, particularly in view of
Young vs. Schroeder, supra.
The property, the subject of this action, consisted of
four noncontiguous tracts of land situated in the North
Columbia Subdivision, Salt Lake County, Utah. It is
undisputed that at the date of sale they had a fair
market value, at execution sale, of approximately $8000.00.
The values of the property were fixed as to their
fair market value at a forced or execution sale at the
date of sale. The following similar questions and
answers were given as to all of the tracts:
"Q. Mr. LeCheminant, do you have an
opinion as to what the fair market value
of Lots 2, 3 and 4, Block 8, of the North
Columbia Sub-division at execution sale
was the 14th day of March, 1950?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Will you state?
A. My opinion of the value is $6,000.00 for
those three lots.
Q. In establishing that value, did you take
into consideration there was a judgment
against this property in the sum of
$13.20?
A. In establishing value I assumed the title
is marketable.
Q. Then this value you placed on this
property would be $13.20 less?
A. If there were any judgments against it,
it would be less the judgments.
Q. Less the amount of the judgment?
A. Yes.
(R. 78-79).
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The appellants did not dispute the values placed on
the properties by the respondent's witness and this is
so notwithstanding the appellant Dowse was a real
estate broker.
As heretofore stated the properties were purchased
by appellant Dowse at execution sale for $46.47.
The general rule is that a Court in equity will not
set aside a sheriff's sale or deed for inadequacy of consideration unless accompanied by irregularities, unfairness, oppression or fraud. However, there is a well
recognized exception and that is where the consideration
is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of
the Court, one which no honest man would take advantage of there arises a conclusive presumption of fraud,
unfairness or oppression. In YOUNG v. SCHKOEDEK,
10 U. 155, 37 P. 252, affirmed 16 Sup. Ct. 512, 161, U.S.
334, 40 L. Ed. 721, supra, the Court said at page 166 :
"It is insisted by appellants that mere
inadequacy of price, however gross, will not
authorize the courts to set aside a judicial sale.
The general rule undoubtedly is that mere inadequacy of price, alone, does not authorize the
disturbance of such a sale; but we are not prepared to sanction the unqualified statement of
• the rule as put by appellants' counsel. If the
inadequacy is so gross as at once to shock the
conscience of all fair and impartial minds, if the
sacrifice is such that every honest man would
hestitate to take advantage of it, it may well be
doubted whether every such case would be beyond
the power of a court of equity to relieve against."
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In BEATTON v. GKAHAM, 111 So. 353, 146 Miss.
246, the Court held that a sale was void where property
valued between $12,000 to $25,000 sold at execution sale
for $600.00 and the sheriff's deed was set aside. The
Court said:
"With reference to the judgment obtained
by James Stone and Sons, attorneys, and the
sale under execution, this sale was void because
of gross inadequacy received for the land * * *."
(Italics added)
In DUNN v. PONCELEB, 178 So. 40, 235 Ala. 269,
supra, the Court set aside a sheriff's deed for gross
inadequacy of consideration. On June 20, 1932, the
judgment creditor purchased at execution sale a tract
of land worth $6,000.00 for $100.00, another $1500.00
for $10.00. The sheriff's deed issued on the same day.
Subsequently, under an alias writ of execution he
purchased a tract of land worth $2,770.00 for $75.00,
another worth $500.00 for $25.00 and a third worth
$200.00 for $25.00. Sheriff's deed issued August 1, 1932.
The purchaser took possession and held for four years
before suit was brought. The sole ground for setting
aside the deeds was gross inadequacy of price. The
Court said:
"The rule obtaining in this jurisdiction, and
which has been recognized and followed by this
Court for more than 100 years, is that mere
inadequacy of price not sufficient to create the
presumption of fraud will not violate a judicial
decision, but where the inadequacy is so glaring
and gross as to at once shock the understanding

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
and conscience of an honest and just man it will,
of itself, authorize the Court to set aside the
sale."
In ELLIS v. POWELL, 117 S. W. (2) 225, the
Supreme Court of Missouri set aside a sheriff's deed
for gross inadequacy of consideration and said:
"It is the general rule that a sheriff's sale
of real property under execution will not be set
aside on mere inadequacy of consideration. However, an exception to this rule is stated by a
standard text as follows: 'Inadequacy of consideration, if it be so gross a nature as to amount
in itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of
fraud, is a ground for cancelling the transaction.
In such cases the relief is granted, not on the
ground of inadequacy of consideration, but on the
ground of fraud as evidenced thereby.' Kerr on
Fraud and Mistake, 161, citing many authorities."
In VAN SENDEN v. O'BRIEN, 58 Fed. (2), 689,
(C.C.D.C.) the Court set aside Marshall's Deed rdne
years after the deeds had issued. Judgment was obtained
in 1916 for $250.00 against Irving E. Jones. In 1918
his property was sold at Marshall's sale. One tract of
land valued at $4,000 was purchased for $200.00, another
worth $1300.00 for $25.00 and a third tract worth $700.00
for $10.00. Jones died in 1923, and in 1917 Mrs. Jones
conveyed her dower interest in the property to the
purchaser. In 1927 Jones' children filed an action to
set aside the deeds, the Court at that late date ordered
them vacated. The Court said, at page 691:
"While it is true the lower court found that
there was no active fraud on Van Senden's part,
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which we understand to mean that the sale was
had in the ordinary way and after proper advertisement, it nevertheless found, and we think
correctly, that the inadequacy of the sale price
was so gross as to shock the conscience. Where
this is the case, the invariable practice has been,
on proper showing, to set the sale aside. The
difficulty in the present case grows out of the
delay in the application."
and again the Court said at page 692:
"The court below saw and heard the witness,
and reached the conclusion that the transaction
out of which this property was acquired for this
grossly inadequate sum could not be approved,
and we see no good reason to reverse its conclusion. As was said by Chancellor Desaussure
in Butler v. Haskell, 4 Desaus. (S.C.) 651,697:
'Wherever the court perceives that a sale of
property has been made at a grossly inadequate
price, such as would shock a correct mind, this
inadequacy furnishes a strong, and in general
a conclusive presumption, though there be no
direct proof of fraud, that an undue advantage
has been taken of the ignorance, the weakness,
or the distress and necessity of the vendor.' In
Massachusetts the statute provides that property
sold at judicial sale may be redeemed within a
year and not after, but the Supreme Court, in
Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180, 6 S.Ct. 686,
29 L. Ed. 839, relieved against this statutory
provision and permitted a later redemption in
a case in many respects similar to this."
In the case of McLellan v. Penick, 289 Fed. 366
(CC 5th), the Court in equity declared a sale void after
the purchaser went into possession where the price paid
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for property worth $75,000.00 was $27,500.00. The Court
said:
"The plantation was unincumbered, and was
easily divisible. It was unnecessary to sell the
whole of it. Under these circumstances, which
surrounded the attachment suits and the sheriff's
sale, and considering the small aggregate amount
of the judgments as compared to the value of the
property, we are of opinion that the levy was
so excessive as to make it the duty of a court of
equity to declare void the sheriff's sale and deed
to the appellant. 17 R.C.L. 206; Fortin v.
Segwick, 133 Iowa, 233, 110 N.W. 460, 12 Ann.
Cas. 337; Williamson v. White, 101 Ga. 276, 28
S. E. 846, 65 Am. St. Rep. 302; Forbes v. Hall,
102 Ga. 47, 28 S.E. 915, 66 Am. St. Rep. 152."
To the same effect Hart v. Parrish, 244 S.W. (2)
105; Butler v. Slattery, 237 N. W. 232, 212 Iowa 277;
Haish v. Hall, 265 P. 1030, 90 Cal. App. 547; 33 C.J.S.
p. 494, Sec. 234.
AN EXECUTION SALE AND SHERIFF'S DEED
ISSUED AFTER THE PERIOD OF REDEMPTION
HAS EXPIRED WILL BE VACATED WHERE THE
PRICE IS INADEQUATE AND THE SALE IS
ATTENDED WITH IRREGULARITIES, A CONSPIRACY, FRAUD OR UNFAIRNESS.
This is not a case where Respondent must rely on
gross inadequacy of price for there was gross inadequacy
of price coupled with fraud, a conspiracy, unfairness
and irregularities.
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The real purpose of the sale was not to satisfy a
judgment of $22.80 but was a result of a design to gain
all of Pender's real estate worth several thousand dollars
for a few dollars. Dowse and others conspired to
this end.
If, as Dowse argues, there was no intent to satisfy
the cost judgment by the delivery of the deed, he had
already set in motion his scheme. No demand during
negotiations being made for its payment nor was there
an attempt to withhold the $22.80, the amount of the
judgment, out of the $100.00 paid by Dowse for the quit
claim deed. We believe, however, it was the intent that
the judgment was to have been satisfied and that the
scheme developed later because of the silence on the part
of Mr. Backman regarding the cost judgment, no demand
being made for its release, which it was Dowse's duty to
satisfy regardless.
The record clearly supports the Court's findings of
fraud and of conspiracy. After the entry of the cost
judgment no demand was made for its payment either
by Dowse or Duncan nor did they advise Respondent or
Mr. Backman, his attorney, that execution had issued;
that they had levied on his real estate or that a sale
had taken place. They stood by silent until after the
period of redemption had expired. There was ample
opportunity to advise them as Dowse, Duncan, Pender
and Backman are all residents of Salt Lake City; Dowse
and Pender were in conferences about other matters
and Duncan and Backman not only negotiated the deed
transaction but they saw each other on the street several
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times. The telephone was always available. Why this
silence if a conspiracy was not in progress f

'

The evidence further established the fact and the
trial court found that on the date of the execution and
sale, appellant Dowse had in his possession personal
property belonging to respondent worth several times
the amount of the judgment; that respondent owned an
automobile; that he had bank accounts in three Salt Lake
City banks, and upon the property levied upon and sold
stood personal property worth in excess of $1000.00 out
of which the judgment could have been satisfied. All of
which was known to appellant Dowse and to his attorney.
If this was no design on the part of Dowse to deprive
respondent of realty worth many thousands of dollars
under color of attempting to satisfy a judgment of
$22.80, why did appellant Dowse direct the sheriff to
levy on respondent's realty in violation of law which
directs that before sale of real estate a judgment must be
satisfied from the un-exempt personal property of the
debtor? And further, why no attempt to collect the judgment toy garnishment proceedings ?

Appellant Dowse knew if he had a valid judgment,
respondent would have paid the same had request for
payment been made, or that by a simple, inexpensive
method, the judgment could have been collected. Appellant Dowse had ample opportunity to enlighten respondent. This he never did but on the contrary he continued
*\ ^ to deal with respondent in all respects as theretofore,
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being most careful to not disclose the fact that the judgment had been entered and remained unsatisfied, and
that execution and sale had been instituted thereon. It
was a wary and crafty silence on the part of appellant
Dowse calculated to and actually succeeded in lulling respondent into a sense of security until the redemption
period had passed. The judgment, if not satisfied, could
have been satisfied at the time the $100 was paid to respondent by appellant Dowse when the quit claim deed
was obtained by Dowse to cut off respondent's appeal
period in the action in which the judgment was entered.
The evidence is undisputed that the property levied
on consisted of four non-contiguous tracts of land and
that either of them was worth more than enough to
satisfy the judgment, one tract being worth approximately, $5,814.96, a second tract $1,066.80, a third
$606.65, and the fourth tract approximately $500.00.
This was known to Dowse for he was a real estate
broker of many years' experience and he did not deny
the values placed thereon by Eespondent's witness and,
notwithstanding, instead of merely directing the sheriff
to levy on one tract, which was more than sufficient to
satisfy the judgment, he caused the sheriff to levy on
all of them—an excessive levy.
In addition, Dowse directed the Sheriff to levy on
the property in such a manner as would discourage
bidders and to diminish the value of the property being
sold. They joined commercial and residential property
and this, in itself, would discourage bidding as usually
a person interested in commercial property would not
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be interested in residential property and vise versa.
These conditions could only be calculated to discourage
bidders and the prices bid. That there was a conspiracy
is further borne out by the conduct of Dowse after he
had contracted to convey two of the lots to Treadway
for $1000.00, by general warranty deed, he conveyed the
property by a special warranty deed after Mr. Bird,
Treadway's attorney, Had questioned Mr. Duncan regarding the sheriff's sale.

(

In addition to the irregularities noted, that is the
levying on and selling the real estate before attempting
to satisfy the judgment out of non-exempt personalty,
the excessive levy, the court found that the four noncontiguous tracts were offered en masse and never
offered separately. Furthermore, Dowse stood by and
permitted Eespondent to pay the $3,086.44 to Morandi,
clearing the title to part of the lots in question, knowing
that Eespondent would probably do so if he remained
silent.
Certainly, in view of the foregoing the trial Court's
findings of fraud, conspiracy and unfairness should be
upheld.
Eule 69 Utah Eules Civil Procedure, directs the
manner in which property will be sold to satisfy a
judgment. Sub-section (b) provides that the execution
shall direct the officer to satisfy the judgment out of
the personal property of the debtor before levying on
his real property. Sub-section (d) provides that the
levy shall not be excessive. Sub-section (e) (3) provides
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that where property is situated in separate parcels they
will be offered separately before it is offered en masse.
We have not set forth the rule verbatum as Appellant
Dowse set it forth at page 12 of his brief.
As to excessive levy the editors of C.J.S. in vol. 33,
page 591 said:
"Excessive levy. It has been held that a levy
which is excessive, see supra paragraph 107, will
not invalidate a sale thereunder; but according
to some authorities if the levy is entirely out of
proportion to the debt the purchaser acquires no
title, although this is so only in extreme cases."
A judgment debtor has a right to have his personal
goods exhausted before any of his real estate can be
levied on.
33 C.J.S. page 251, Sec, 100;
Haws v. Fracarol, 27 F. (2) 74;
Blasingame v. Wallan, 261 P. 42, 32 Ariz. 580;
Stone v. Ordian-Wells Co. 20 P. (2) 639, 94
Mont. 20;
Barry v. Horton, 238 N. W. 763, 122 Neb. 20;
Alt v. Kwiatek, 17 A (2) 161, 128 N. J. Eq. 469.
A sale en masse where property is in separate
parcels is prejudicial and void where substantial injury
is shown and in any event voidable.
33 C.J.S. page 491, sec. 232;
National Eealty Sales Co. v. Ewing, 55 U. 438,
186 Pac. 1103;
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Adams v. Pratt, District Judge, et al, 87 U. 80,
48 P. (2d) 444.
In Young v. Schroeder, 10 Ut. 155, 37 Pac. 252,
supra, the Court vacated three marshall's deeds where
property worth $26,000.00 sold for $1927.06. Before
levying on the real property the marshall attempted to
satisfy the judgment out of unexempt property of
judgment debtor. There were three levies all directed
by the judgment creditor's attorney. The first levy
severed a portion out of a larger tract to which there
was no ingress or egress. All of the realty levied upon
was held in common by the judgment debtor with his
sister. The Court said:

.

"It further appears from the record that it
was the design and purpose of Stephens &
Schroeder at the outset to exhaust, if possible,
all the property of plaintiff, of whatever nature
or description, regardless of its value, under
said several executions, and that they in fact
accomplished that purpose."

Again the court said:
"This is not a case which rests on mere
inadequacy of price alone, but one r where the
sales complained of were attented by such substantial irregularities as must have prevented a
sale at a fair sum. For instance, one of the parcels of said lot 2, levied upon and sold under the
first execution, is described as beginning 101
feet north and 39y2 feet east of the southwest
corner of said lot 2, thence east 15y2 feet, north
28 feet, west 15y2 feet, and south 28 feet to the
beginning. Eeference to the plat in evidence
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shows that the property thus described is a portion of that part of lot 2 to which plaintiff and
his sister derived title through the will of their
deceased father, as before stated, and is included
within the exterior boundaries of that portion
thereof shown by the record to have been at that
time leased to one Gebhardt, The purchaser of
the part thus levied on and sold by the marshall
acquired a piece of land having no means of
access to it. It is needless to say that such a
transaction must necessarily result in a sacrifice
of the property. Again, in the sales made under
the several executions of portions of said lot 2
it appears that in each instance the levy was upon
and the sale of all the plaintiff's right, title and
interest in a specific part of the portion of said
lot 2 so owned by him and his sister, Lydia Y.
Merrill. This is also an irregularity that renders
the sale voidable, if not void, the necessary
tendency of a sale under such a levy being to
depreciate the value of the property sold."
And again the court said:
"It is contended by the appellants that relief
cannot be granted in this case, because the
statutory period for redemption had expired
before this suit was brought. The cases are by
no means rare where a court of equity has interf e r e d to set aside a sale after the time for
redemption has expired, such sale having been
attended by irregularities, and having resulted
in a gross sacrifice of the judgment debtor's
property."
In Magnus v. Tobias 169 N. E. 741, 337 111. 605, the
Equity Court set aside a sheriff's deed which issued
after the period of redemption had expired where
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property valued at $25,000.00 was purchased for $107.73.
The judgment debtor had no notice of the sale. Demand
for payment of the judgment was never made upon her.
The Court said:

V

"Appellants also insists that services of the
execution and demand for property was not
necessary. Whether section 28 of the Cost Act
(Smith-Hurd Eev. St. 1929, C. 33) applies or not,
appellee was not served with the execution, and
one cannot read this record without being convinced that the actions of appellant and his
attorney, Webster, in levying the execution, selling the land at judicial sale, and acquiring a deed
to it, were conducted in a manner well calculated
to leave appellee in ignorance that her property
had been sold. It is very evident from the record
that she did not intend to abandon the property,
for she reduced the principal of the mortgage on
the property to $10,000 after the sale, also collected rents from the property and paid the taxes
against it. After appellant had notified the
tenants on the property to pay him the rent
appellee became aware of the fact her property
worth $35,000.00, subject to encumbrances of
$11,500.00, had been sold to appellant and
Webster for $107.73 to pay a judgment for $86.45
rendered against appellee. The price for which
the property was sold was grossly inadequate,
in sales under judicial process where there is
a right of redemption, inadequacy of price and
accompanied by circumstances of irregularity or
unfairness will not avoid a sale. It has been uniformity held by this court that where property
has been sold at judicial sale for a grossly inadequate price, even slight circumstances indicating
unfairness or fraud will furnish sufficient
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grounds for equitable interference. Wilkinson v.
Cox, 228 111. 306, 81 N.E. 1020; Davis, Cory &
Co. v. Chicago Dock Co. 129 111. 180; 21 N.E.
830; Block v. Cooper, 318 111. 182, 149 N.E. 21.
It also appears that appellee had ample resources
both personal and real to pay the judgment for
costs had she been notified it was demanded by
appellant."
The above case is very much like the case at issue.
In Greenberg v. Kaplan, 268 N. W. 788, 277 Mich.
1, the Court set aside a deed to property purchased at
execution sale for $377.40 where the property was worth
$9,000.00. No demand was made for payment of judgment. Judgment creditor permitted the owner to pay
the tax. No attempt was made to satisfy the judgment
by garnishment proceedings although counsel for the
judgment debtor knew that such a remedy was available.
The court set aside the deed and held the sale was void.
The court said:
"In view of the gross inadequacy of the price,
coupled with the unmistakable signs of fraud
and unfairness in the instant case, we hold the
sale must be set aside. It is quite significant that
no attempt was made to collect the balance of
the judgment and that Bartlett, who had an
interest in the judgment, was not given any share
of the proceeds. Chaplain, as attorney for
Schevitz & Bartlett, knew that he had funds
either in his possession or largely under his control which by a simple, inexpensive method,
quickly could have been applied to the judgment.
Baier's interest in the property of a value of at
least $9,000 was bid in for $377.40 in Chaplain's
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presence by his brother-in-law, in the name of
one who had every appearance of being a dummy.
Although Chaplain had reasons to believe that
Baier did not know of the sale because of Baier's
actions in bringing the injunction suit and paying
taxes, both after the sale had taken place, and
although Chaplain had ample opportunity to
enlighten Baier, he never did this. Although
"I
Chaplain, if he had told his partner, Greenberg,
;
of the opportunity to rid themselves of an obligation of approximately $9,000 for much less,
might have been able to procure enough cash to
bid in at the sale, he chose to remain silent and
let his brother-in-law buy in under the name of
f
a client and friend of Chaplain. In view of the
surrounding circumstances and the actions of
the parties despite the carelessness of Mulford
and the attack on his credibility, we believe that
an agreement was made between Chaplain and
Mulford that garnishment would be resorted to
in collecting the Schevitz judgment against Baier;
but, in view of Baier's and Mulford's reasonable
reliance upon this agreement, the execution and
sale, in contravention of the understanding, were
fraudulent."
In Citizens State Bank vs. McBoberts, 239 P. 1028,
29 Ariz. 173, the court in equity vacated a sheriff's deed
issued after the period of redemption had expired where
property worth $17,833.00 sold to satisfy a judgment
of $705.39. The Court said:
"Now, it must be admitted that the price
realized for the property was grossly inadequate
, —less than 5 per cent, of its average estimated
value. We know the courts are reluctant to set
aside deeds of property, sold under legal process,
merely for inadequacy of price, and justly so.
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Generally speaking, they will not do so, unless
the equity of the situation is so appealing as that
to do otherwise would shock the judgment and
the conscience. * * * In view of the fact that
plaintiff had never denied her liability on the
note but always admitted it, and only neglected to
take it up because of the assurance of the primary
debtor that he would endeavor to pay it, and the
bank's agents having full knowledge that she
was only an accommodation maker, we think in
fairness such agents should have seen her personally and told her, not only of Starr's delinquency, but what steps they contemplated taking
against her property; or, somewhere along the
line and before the right of redemption expired,
they should have informed her of the situation.
In failing to impart such information to plaintiff, and in instructing the bank's attorney not
to do so, they not only took an undue advantage
of her, but pursued a course well calculated to
mislead and surprise her. This circumstance,
in connection with the great disparity of price
realized to the value of the property, it would
seem is amply sufficient reason to cancel the
deed."
In Lovejoy v. Americus 191 P. 790, 111 Wash. 571,
the court set aside the sheriff's deed issued after
the period of redemption had expired where property
worth in excess of $4000.00 was sold at sheriff's sale for
$87.29, because of inadequacy of price failure to notify
the judgment creditor of the sale although the statute did
not require it, and this notwithstanding that prior to
the sale the judgment debtor had made repeated
demands upon the judgment debtor for payment of the
judgment. The judgment creditor permitted the judg-
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ment debtor to pay taxes and special improvements and
to improve the property. The Court said :
"The judgment in the present case is entirely
justified. The respondents acted promptly upon
receiving notice that their property had been
sold. Mr. Lovejoy was a teamster in the town of
Hillyard, and trusted nearly all his otEer business
to his wife, who was, much of the time, almost
an invalid. After the issuance of the execution,
followed by the sheriff's sale, and while the
rights of respondents were passing away by the
lapse of time into the hands of appellant
Americus, the continuous dunning theretofore
engaged in was changed into an apparently wary
and crafty silence, highly calculated to and
aictually succeeded in lulling the respondents into
a sense of security until the year for redemption
passed bv. Graff am v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180,
6 Sup. Ct. 686, 29 L. Ed. 839. The judgment,
with interest and costs, could have been satisfied,
prior to the execution, by garnishment proceedings against the tenant of respondents for less
than 5 months' rental, while during the period
of redemption from the sheriff's sale the amount
of the judgment, interest, and costs, and increased
costs, of $87.92, could have been satisfied by less
than 6 months' rental from the same tenant, to
which appellants, as purchasers at the sheriff's
sale, were entitled under the provisions of section
602, Kern. Code."
To the same effect see:
Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180, 6 Sup. Ct. 686,
21 L. Ed. 839;
VanGraafieland v. Wright, 228 S.W. 465, 268
Mo. 414;
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33 CJS, page 494, See. 234;
Foote v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co. 92
Fed (2) 744;
Home Owners Loan Corp. vs. Braxton, 44
N.E. (2) 989;
Rogers v. Barton, 53 N.E. (2) 862, 386.111. 244;
Fox v. Jackson, 64 N.E. (2) 799, 116 Ind.
App. 390;
Baar v. Smith, 257 P. 861, 97 Cal. App. 398;
Hyman v. Stern, 215 P. 911, 61 Cal. App. 566;
Darden v. Reese, 200 P. (2) 81, 88 Cal. App. 904;
Boiani v. Wilson, 132 Atl. 881, 41 R. I. 317;
Neussler v. Bergman, 251 P. 578,141 Wash. 297.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S
FINDING OF SLANDER OF TITLE, ITS AWARD OF
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Appellant Dowse asks this court to reverse its decision in the case of Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., (Utah),
208 P2d 956.
In the instant case we have a real estate broker of
long years' experience who knew the effect his acts would
have on the title to respondent's property. Appellant
by his wrongful acts wholly deprived respondent of the
use and enjoyment of his property and deprived respondent of the rentals received therefrom by respondent
prior to the sheriff's sale.
Appellant challenges the court's finding of slander
of title and contends that a cause of action for slander

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
or disparagement of property or of the title thereto
was neither alleged or proved.
Kespondent alleged in paragraphs 13 and 14 of his
complaint that appellant in all of the acts theretofore
specifically set forth acted maliciously and in order to
vex and harass respondent and that appellant knew the
filing of the judgment and the sale of the property would
cast a cloud upon and slander upon respondent's title
and that the same decreased the value of respondent's
real estate and made it unmarketable.
That by paragraph 17 of respondent's complaint
respondent alleges that appellant acted maliciously and
that appellant was guilty of oppression and malice. That
the case is one in which punitive and exemplary damages
is proper and that $20,000 is a proper amount of exemplary and punitive damages.
The evidence not only showed that the appellant
failed to satisfy the judgment which cast a cloud upon
all of the property of respondent after having accepted
the benefits of the deed given by respondent to cut off
his appeal period and settle the differences between
appellant and respondent which the trial court found
satisfied the judgment but in addition appellant procured title to all of the property levied upon and sold
at sheriff's sale, thus depriving respondent of his title
to his property.
The decision in Burkett v. Griffiths cited by appellant was decided in 1891. That decision has been
broadened as is pointed out by appellant.
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The Gudger v. Manton case, 21 Cal. 2d, 537, 134
P2d 217 relied upon by appellant appears to be more
favorable to respondent than to appellant. In that case
the plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages in the
sum of $16,000 in an action for slander of title. The
slander consisted of defendant's having caused execution on a judgment to be made without a privilege to do
so. The court quoted from Eestatement, Torts, Sec. 624
saying:
"At the outset it is helpful to have before
us an accurate definition of that tort. It may be
best stated as follows: 'One who, without a privilege to do so, publishes matter which is untrue
and disparaging to another's property in land
under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a third
person as purchaser or lessee thereof might be
determined thereby, is liable for pecuniary loss
resulting to the other from the impairment of
vendibility thus caused.'"
The court in applying the rule said:
"It has been held that the recording of a document making a false claim to real property may
constitute the publication of the disparaging
matter in the tort in question."
Appellant cites the Wyoming case of Barquin v.
Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164, 201 Pac. 352, 202 Pac. 1107,
and argues that the facts showing the special damages
claimed must be stated, that an intending purchaser of
the property was prevented from making a contract to
buy or from buying the land or that a third party
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purchaser was induced to breach his contract. This same
argument was used by the defendant Doris Trust Company in the case of Dowse vs. Doris Trust Company,
supra, in which the court speaking through Mr. Justice
Wade said:
"Defendants president is a real estate broker
with more than 40 years of experience in the
real estate business. At the time he filed the
instrument he knew that he had no rights or
interest in the property, and did so either to
force plaintiff to sell to him or make it difficult
to sell to anyone else, under such a state of facts
his filing was malicious. See Kelly v. First State
Bank, 145 Minn. 331, 177 N.W. 347, 9 ALE 929
and annotation on page 931. In the Kelly case
the court held that the malicious filing for record
of an instrument known to be inoperative is
regarded as slander of title, but if the person
records an instrument he has a right to record,
it is, of course, not slander of title. Under the
pleading and the facts proved, defendant did
not have a privilege to record the instrument and
his doing so was malicious."
The court further said:
"It is defendant's contention that plaintiff having
failed to allege and prove a particular sale or
sales which had been lost because of its action
that plaintiff had failed to present for the consideration of the court, an essential element of
the action for slander of title, i.e., a pecuniary
loss. It is defendant's contention that attorneys
fees are not recoverable as special damages and
that such damages can only be proven by the loss
of a particular sale which must be alleged as
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well as proved. It cites as authority for this
contention the cases of McGuiness v. Hargiss,
56 Wash. 162, 105 P.233, 21 Ann. Cas. 220,
Hubbard v. Scott, 85 Or. 1, 166 P. 33, and City
of Shreveport v. Kahn, 194 La. 55, 193 So. 461.
All of the above cases held that attorneys' fees
are not recoverable in an action for slander of title.
However, we are not impressed with the reasoning of those cases and others to the same effect.
The action of slander of title is based on a wrongful act but for which the plaintiff would not have
had to incur any expense, either for costs or for
attorney's fees. The reasoning in Chesbro v.
Powers, 78 Mich. 472, 44 N.W. 290, is more in
harmony with justice." (Itallics added)
Mr. Justice Wade then goes on and quotes extensively
from the Chesebro case.
Appellant contends that there is no evidence to
support the court's finding 9 and charges the trial court
with an illegal, capricious and wholly arbitrary finding
and says the court was confused in awarding punitive
and exemplary damages, claiming that the only damages
allowable for slander of title are special damages. Such
is not the case. This court said in the Dowse v. Doris
Trust Company case supra:
"That punitive damages may be awarded in an
action for slander of title see Hopkins v. Drowne,
21 K.I. 20, 41 A. 567."
From a reading of the Hopkins case cited by the
Utah court in the Doris Trust case we find the following
statement by the court:
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"In addition to the actual damages sustained by
the plaintiff, it was discretionary with the jury
to also award punitive or exemplary damages.
(Kenyon v. Cameron, 17 E.I. 122, 20 Atl. 233;
Vogel v. McAuliffe, 18 E.I. 791, 31 Atl. 1.)"
The trial court having properly found that the acts
of appellant were malicious, respondent is entitled to
an award as pecuniary and exemplary damages of considerably more than the $500.00 granted by the trial
court.
In answer to subdivision V of appellant's brief,
Whether Attorney's fees in an action for slander of
title are allowable, appellant again asks this court to reverse the Dowse v. Doris Trust Company case supra
from which case we have quoted under Respondent's
answer to subdivision IV of appellant's brief and
in which case this court quoted from Restatement of
the Law of Torts, Sec. 633, pages 347-8, wherein it
is stated:
"The pecuniary loss for which a publisher of
disparaging matter is liable under the rules
stated in Sees. 624 and 626-627 is restricted to
'(a) that pecuniary loss which directly and
immediately results from the impairment of the
vendibility of the thing in question caused by
publication of the disparaging matter, and
(b) the expense of litigation reasonably
necessary to remove the doubt cast by the disparagement upon the other's property in the
thing or upon the quality thereof.'"
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Following which Mr. Justice Wade said:
"Attorney's fees are certainly a reasonable
expense of litigation."
To the same effect do we answer subdivision VI
on the question of punitive damages.
|
It has been said that to support a judgment for
pecuniary damages malice must be expressed. It is also
said that malice need not be expressly shown but it may
be implied.
See Gudger v. Manton, (Cal.) 134 P2d 217 in which
the court said:
"True, it has been said or intimated that
malice is an essential element in slander of title.
(Citing cases) That malice may, however, be
express or implied. Feron v. Fodera, 169 Cal.
370, 148 P. 200; Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41,
265 P. 844; see cases collected 129 A.L.R. 179.
And if there is an absence of privilege or justification, and the other elements necessary are
present, an implication of malice in Jaw is proper,
if that term is used, or actual malicd may in some
cases show lack of privilege."
The Gudger v. Manton case supra, involved the levy
and recording of a writ of execution upon real property
regarding which the ruling of the court is Applicable and
which is in part as follows:
f
"Such instruments on record had all the appearance of an assertion by defendants of a claim to
an interest in the property, and as a matter of
common knowledge would have an effect upon
a prospective purchaser of the property and the
merchantability of the title. He would naturally
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assume that plaintiff's title was not merchantible,
as it was encumbered by a lien to an indefinite
extent. Defendants as reasonable persons should
have reasonably foreseen that such would be the
effect of their action. Bestatement, Torts, Sec.
629. As we have seen, the reasonable imputation
of the recording was a claim of an interest
adverse to plaintiff's title. Whether a cloud on
the title in the technical sense existed wras
immaterial."
It is not necessary, however, to rely on implied
malice inasmuch as there is an abundance of evidence
to show malice in fact. It is clearly evident that appellant wras disgruntled at respondent's asking for and
collecting $100 for a quit claim deed given to cut off
respondent's appeal period. The act thereafter on the
part of appellant was a design to get even with respondent, not to collect the mere pitance of $22.80 but to
incurr the greatest amount of expense possible upon
respondent and to take from respondent all property
possible. This malice is further borne out by the evidence of appellant's having sold the washing machine
for $10.00 which respondent entrusted to appellant when
it had a value of $175.00, which was more than enough
to satisfy the judgment had it been a valid one.
Under subdivision V appellant cites general
principles of law which do not apply to recorded instruments affecting title to real property, nor does appellant
distinguish those cases involving instruments recorded
and affecting title to real property and those cases not
involving these facts. There is a clear distinction.
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I t has been held that where one places of record
an instrument which compels the owner to come to terms
with him is liable in a suit for slander of title. See
Collins v. Whitehead, (CC) 34 F 121, cited in 150 ALR
721 in which the court in sustaining a suit in the nature
of an action for slander of title to recover damages for
the recording by the defendant of a proposed contract
of sale after he had failed to comply therewith within
the required time, said that one who wantonly puts on
record such a paper, apparently with the intent to compel the owner of the property to come to terms with
him, ought not to have refuge in the technicalities or
the weakness of the law; that the injury to the plaintiff
was real, as he was compelled to bring suit to remove
the cloud from his title, and, for the time, his property
was useless to him; and that it would be a reproach to
the law to give only nominal damages in such a case,
and a verdict for substantial damages was upheld.
On appeal, all conflicts in evidence must be resolved
in favor of respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable
inferences must be indulged in to uphold the verdict,
if possible.

ANALYSIS OF A U T H O R I T I E S CITED
BY A P P E L L A N T DOWSE
Appellant Dowse cites four Utah decisions in
support of his claim that the sale could not be attacked
in equity, none of which are in point.
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In Dickert v. Weise, 2 Ut. 350, 40 Pac. St. Eeports,
350, there was no inadequacy of price, irregularities,
fraud, unfairness or conspiracy. The sale was fair and
regular.
In National Realty Sales Co. v. Ewing, 55 U. 438,
186 Pac. 1103, the debtor had knowledge of the sale
and stood silent. The court said there was nothing in
the record "to suggest fraud and concealment."
In Chausse v. Bank of Garland, 71 U. 586, 268 Pac.
781, inadequacy of price, not gross inadequacy of price
was the sole ground.
In Adams v. Pratt, District Judge, 87 Utah, 89, 48
Pac. (2) 444, the only ground for vacating the sale was
failure to offer separately non-contiguous tracts before
selling enmass.
All of the foregoing cases were foreclosure proceedings and the judgment debtor had been notified of the
sale. In none of the cases cited was there a multiple of
causes, viz: gross inadequacy of price, irregularities, concealment, fraud, unfairness and conspiracy. It should
be noted that from this list of cases the only Utah case
in point Young v. Schroeder, 10 Ut. 155, 37 Pac. 252, 161
U.S. 334, 40 Law Ed. 721,.16 Sup. Ct. 512 was omitted.
The appellant Dowse also cites seven California
cases in support of his position, none of which
are in point. Some of the cases relied on support
respondent. In Smith v. Randall, 6 Cal. 47, 2 Pac. St.
Rep. 47, the judgment debtor was present at the sale
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and directed the sheriff to sell realty rather than his
personality. The debtor claimed that he could not waive
this right. There was no fraud, concealment, unfairness
or conspiracy. In Bechtel v. Weir, 152 Cal. 443, 93 Pac.
75, 15 A.L.R. (N.S.) 549, the only irregularity was in
offering the property for sale, that is, it was not offered
separately before being sold enmasse. Batini v. Ivancich,
105 Cal. App. 391, 287 Pac. 523 the sole ground was the
mis-statement of the date of the entry of the judgment
the court said:
"and further than this the court has always lent a
willing ear to the debtor who could show fraud
or unfairness in the sale of his property, and
where a proper sho^ving has been made full relief
has followed."
Mitchell v. Alpha Hardware &Supply Co., 7 Cal.
App. (2) 52, 45 Pac. (2) 442 the sole grounds was
failure to offer separately before offering enmasse.
In Knapp vs. Rose, 32 Cal (2d) 530, 197 P (2d) 7,
the court supports respondent and recognizes that under
certain facts a suit in equity to vacate a sale and deed
is proper.
Appellant would have this Honorable Court apply
the rule of law as laid down in Rauer v. Hertweck, 175
Cal 278; 165 Pac. 946. While it is recognized there is
no legal duty imposed upon the Sheriff to search for
the debtor in order that he might be given actual notice
nor of the creditor to do so, still the courts do not and
will not we think encourage a judgment creditor to
refrain from making demand upon the debtor, to trans-
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act business matters with the debtor from time to time
and to continue to deal with the debtor at all times after
the judgment has been entered and especially one of
such a small amount, in the same manner as the creditor
would have done had the relationship of debtor and
creditor not existed. Appellant knew respondent could
pay the judgment at any time demand was made upon
him, however, the record reflects the fact that the concern of appellant at all times was that respondent might
learn of the judgment before appellant had accomplished
his cunning act and thus defeat the purpose of appellant.
Appellant cites Story's Equity Jurisprudence Sec.
245 as authority in support of his argument that inadequacy of consideration is not of itself sufficient
grounds for relief in equity. Respondent does not rely
upon inadequacy of consideration alone, neither did the
trial court find inadequacy of consideration alone as
grounds for setting aside the sale, the court found inadequacy coupled with irregularities, unfairness, fraud
and a conspiracy.
The following cases cited by appellants appear
to be those on which one element alone is involved, viz:
either inadequacy of consideration, failure to offer in
separate parcels, failure to satisfy out of unexempted
personal property or failure to give personal notice of
sale to debtor; no case is cited wherein all of the elements
are present as in the instant case.
In Thomas v. Thomas, 44 Mont. 102, 119 Pac. 283,
the deed was collaterally attacked because of failure
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to sell property separately. The court said that the
debtor should have either moved to set aside the sale or
proceeded by a bill in equity. That either was a direct
attack.
In Fox v. Curry, 96 Mont. 212, 29 Pac. (2) 663, the
sole ground was a defective notice, however, the court
said that it appears the whole transaction was in good
faith.
In the Idaho case of Coghlan v. City of Boise, 36
Ida. 613, 212 Pac. 867, the court merely held that a
judgment debtor present at a sale cannot complain of a
sale enmasse when he made no request to sell otherwise.
In Mt. Vernon National Bank v. Morse, 128 Ore.
64, 264 Pac. 439, the sole ground was an irregularity in
the notice of sale.
In Whitworth v. McKee, 32 Wash. 83; 72 Pac. 1046
the court held that a collateral attack could not be made
on a judgment when the sheriff made a return that he
was unable to find personal property sufficient to satisfy
a judgment. The court recognizes the necessity of such a
return. We again direct the court's attention to Love joy v.
Americus, supra, which set aside a Sheriffs Deed issued
after the period of redemption had expired because of
inadequacy of price, failure to give notice and failure to
collect by garnishment proceedings.
Oliver v. Dougherty, 8 Ariz. 65, 68 Pac. 553 the sole
ground was failure to levy onj^ersonality, nothing more.
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Regarding the Arizona decision cited, the attention
of the Court is directed again to Citizen's State Bank
vs. McRoberts, supra, in which the court vacated a deed
issued after the period of redemption had run where
inadequacy of price, no demand, or notification of sale
was given.
In Bird v. Kitchens, Ark; 221 SW (2d) 795,
cited by appellant we find a case wherein complainant knew of the sheriff's sale being conducted and while
he did not attend the sale still he sent his secretary to
attend with instructions to make notes of that which took
place, after the deed issued he sought to collaterally
attack the deeds on alleged irregularities committed by
the officer conducting the sale.
And in Gross v. Simsack, 364 Pa. 337; 72 Atl. (2d)
103, we find where property which had an assessed
value of $7500.00 brought $9100 at the execution sale
and the court held that there was no showing of
inadequacy of consideration.
Respondent is unable to find the Knox v. Noggle
case under Appellant's citation.
In Bonner v. Lockhart, 236 Ala. 171; 181 South. 767,
the court found that the record did not sustain an averment that complainant had no knowledge of the execution sale. Complainant had received and ignored the
statutory demands for possession of the property levied
upon. The court further found that the right of redemption had been forfeited without any action on the
part of respondent lulling complainant into delay or
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non-compliance with the demand for possession. It
appears complainant persistently ignored and disregarded all rights of respondent.
The Horken v. Eason, 10 Ga. App. 236; 73 S.E.
352 case cited is one which was decided on an agreed
statement of facts which does not appear in the record
of the case.
In Dixon v. Peacock, 30 Okla. 87; 141 Pac. 429 it
was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant that
the proceeding was a collateral attach on the judgment,
the property sought to be recovered was sold at sheriff's
sale and the sale was confirmed by the court, the court
having found the proceedings of the sheriff regular.
The Sheehan v. All Person, etc. 80 Cal. App. 393;
252 Pac. 337 case does not appear to be in point, there
the complaint sought to collaterally attach the judgment
on which execution issued.
And in Sellers v. Johnson, 207 Ga. 644; 63 S.E. (2d)
904 the fraud relied upon was breach of an alleged
agreement between counsel for the litigants under which
it was agreed they would notify each other before any
hearing or issuance of execution or levys or sale of
property. Respondent failed to give actual notice of
sale. There was nothing in the record to show that the
sale was not properly conducted.
In White v. Adams, 52 Cal. 435; 1 Pac, States Rep.
435 the court said:
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"It is to be observed there is nothing in the
record showing any fraud or bad faith upon the
part of White, who was the plaintiff in the proceedings to foreclose the mortgage."
The Hamilton v. Waters, case 93 Cal. App. 866;
210 Pac. (2d) 67 is one in which action was brought to
recover damages against the purchasers at sheriff's
sale and the marshall by reason of the eviction of complainant from property purchased at sale. In sustaining
demurrers to the complaint the court said:
"Her only relief, if her allegation is true, is by
an action in equity to set aside the judgment. The
instant cause is a collateral attack on a valid,
final judgment."
In H.O.L.C. v. Edwards, 329 Pa. 529; 198 Atl. 123,
124 the question was on constitutionality of a Mortgage
Deficiency Act enacted under the laws of the state of
Penn. This act was held unconstitutional. This case is
not in point. True the question of inadequacy of consideration was brought up but that was not the controlling factor in the case.
In Sikes et al. v. Beaver, et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. 157 S.E.
467 there was no evidence of irregularities or facts
from which fraud could be drawn, nor does it appear
that personality was available upon which levy could
have been made.
Appellant cites City of Sanford v. Ashton, 131 Fla.
759; 179 South. 765. Here the court laid down the rule
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that the judgment debtor was not entitled to cancellation of deed at execution sale after one year following
the ?sale in the absence of a showing of mistake, accident,
surprise, misconduct, fraud or irregularity in connection with the judgment, execution or sale.
In Solomon v. Neubrecht, 300 Mich. 177; 1 N.W.
(2d) 501 it was held that the sale would not be set aside
because of inadequacy of consideration where no evidence of any wrongdoing by the creditor or of fraud,
irregularities or unfairness appeared.
Lawyers Co-op. Publ. Co. v. Bennett, 34 Fla. 302;
16 South. 185 is relied upon by appellant. As an example
of the cases cited by appellant we quote syllabus 3 and
4 of this case.
"3. $15.00 is a grossly inadequate price, at a
public judicial sale, for land worth $350 to $400.
4. The general rule is that mere inadequacy of
price alone is not sufficient to set aside a judicial
sale, but when such inadequacy is connected with
or shown to result from any mistake, accident,
surprise, misconduct, fraud or irregularity, the
sale will generally be set aside."
The Sellers v. Johnson, 207 Ga. 644; 63 S.E. (2d)
904 held the pleading not sufficient.
And in Marr v. Marr, 73 N.J.Eq. 643; 70 Atl. 375
the evidence was to the effect that the consideration
paid was for but one-half the value of the property and
the court held this fact was not such inadequacy as would
warrant the setting aside the sale.
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The case of McAlvay v. Consumers Salt Co., 112 Cal.
App. 383; 297 Pac. 135 involved a sale of stock in a
corporation, the evidence showed the total number of
shares issued does not appear and the only direct evidence of the value of the stock in litigation was Stockwell's testimony that it was worth $150,000.00. As
against this however, is evidence that the business
showed a deficit for the year ending June 30, 1925 and
that the net profits for the following year approximated
but $2200.00.
Kauer v. Hertweck, 175 Cal. 278; 165 Pac. 946;
McLain Land & Investment Co. v. Swofford Bros. Dry
Goods, 11 Okla. 429; 68 Pac. 502; Dickinson-Keed
Anderson Co. et al v. Markley, 117 Okla. 17, 244 Pac.
754; Burton v. Kipp, 30 Mont. 275; 76 Pac. 563; and
Elliott & Healy v. Wirth, 34 Idaho, 797; 198 Pac. 757
each held mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set
aside a sale if unaccompanied by elements of fraud, unfairness or oppression.
In Pavlovich v. Watts, 46 Cal. App. 103; 115 Pac.
(2d) 511, the action involved notes evidencing a claim
levied on which claim had a face value of $21,000.00 but
subject to the term of an option and lease agreement so
that the actual value of the claim levied upon was not
as great as $21,000, because of the uncertainty of the
value of the claim it was held that the sale of the claim
for $250 did not require the sale to be set aside because
of inadequacy of price paid.
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And in the Dewey v. Loomis case, 113 Kan. 750;
216 Pac. 271, it is not shown just what value the
property had but it was sold for $100 and while it was
contended that but one bid was made it was evident
that about 20 persons attended the sale.
In St. Paul Trust v. Olson, 52 N.D. 315; 202 N.W.
472 the price was held not inadequate when property
worth $136,000 was sold for the equivalent of $111,000.
Raymond v. Halborn, 23 Wis. 57. This case was
decided in 1868. The property sold consisted of lots
5 and 6 in Block 1 in City of Racine, the two lots were
mortgaged by complainant and sold under foreclosure
as mortgaged, the court found they could have been
sold separately but having been mortgaged as one there
was no defect in the sale.
Coulter v. Meiggs, 58 R.I. 30; 191 Atl. 115 in which
the court said there was no evidence that the sale in
one parcel was unjust or inequitable but the court
further said:
"This court has approved the principle laid down
in many cases that a sale enmasse, when less
would be sufficient, will be declared void, and
generally it is the duty of the officer to sell by
parcel and not the whole tract in one entire sale"
(Italics added)
The Coulter case supports the contention of
respondent and is in harmony with the trial court's
decision in the instant case.
In Reed v. Gourley, Tex. C.A.; 109 S.W. (2d) 242
there was no proof whether or not the property was
sold in bulk or in separate parcels.
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The cases of Solomon v. Neubrecht and Smith v.
Randall have heretofore been distinguished.
In Clark v. Fell, 139 Pa. 469; 22 Atl. 649 there was
no evidence that personalty was available or that
sheriff did not attempt to levy on personalty. The court
said, "the presumption is that a sheriff who has levied
an execution on real estate without making a return that
there was no personalty, did his duty and that there
was no personalty."
In the instant case deputy sheriff Bleak testified
to the fact that he made no effort to levy upon
personalty.
The case of Jacobsen v. Wigen, 52 Minn. 6; 53 N.W.
1016 is favorable to respondent and the law therein
stated is applicable to respondent's case. Under 2 of
the syllabus we find the following:
"So an execution sale of real estate where there
is personal property subject to levy, within the
knowledge of the execution creditor is not
absolutely void; but if prejudicial, and especially
if fraudulent or unconscionable, such sale may
be set aside or vacated and the proper relief
may be sought in a suit in equity brought directly
for such purpose."
In Bock v. Losekamp, 179 Cal. 674; 179 Pac. 516 the
purchaser at the sale was not a party to the action but a
stranger, the judgment debtor knew of the entry of the
judgment; three futile demands for payment of the judgment were made on the debtor's attorneys. It was not
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claimed or found that there was any irregularity in the
proceedings connected with the sale. This case cites and
distinguishes the earlier California case of Odell v. Cox,
90 Pac. 194 in which we find 1 of the syllabus reading as
follows:
"Though mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient grounds for vacating an execution sale,
it is a circumstance to be considered in connection with other circumstances. Where property worth $2,000 was sold at execution sale to
the creditor for $26.50, and the execution debtor's
ignorance of the levy and sale was excusable, the
sale will be vacated, though statutory notice of
the sale was given."
It is most unusual to find a case which so definitely
supports respondent's contention and the trial court's
finding as does the Odell v. Cox case supra.
In Mortimer v. Young, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 317; 127
Pac. (2d) 950 also cited by appellant under subdivision
5, we find the case was controlled by section 692a of the
Code of Civil Procedure of California which requires
demand for notice of sale to be given, complainant made
no such demand and could therefore not complain of
having received no notice.
IN ANSWER TO
APPELLANTS TREADWAY'S BRIEF
Preliminary to respondent's argument to appellants
Treadway respondent cites:
66 C. J. 1131, sec. 968. Records—(a) General.
"Constructive notice arising from the registry of instruments is purely a matter of positive
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statutory regulation, but registry laws have been
widely passed, the intention being to do away
with all notice, other than that given by statute,
except actual notice in fact. When the statutory
requirements are substantially complied with,
subsequent purchasers are charged with constructive notice of the record, which is as effectual in law as actual notice. The presumption of
notice thus raised is conclusive and incontrovertible, and proof of actual notice is dispensed with."
Sec. 969. Duty of Searching Kecord and
Bight to Bely Thereon.
Where titles to real estate are of record, it
is the duty of a purchaser, in the absence of any
special agreement, to search the public records
for himself, and to make a complete examination
of such records, for such information as they
may contain regarding the validity of the title
of the real estate he would purchase. The intending purchaser is not required to do more than to
examine the public records in order to ascertain
the state of the recorded title, and, if he find
this complete, he can purchase with safety.
"ABSTBACT. A party is not entitled to
rely on an abstract but is charged with notice
of all matters affecting his title which are of
record."

Sec. 970. FACTS OF WHICH BECOBD
IS NOTICE.
An instrument properly recorded is notice
of all the facts therein expressly set forth, and
also of all other material facts which an inquiry
thereby reasonably suggested would have disclosed. (And see long line of cases cited in
support of this principle.)
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Sec. 57-3-2 UCA 1953 provides:
"Every conveyance, or instrument in writing
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or
proved, and certified, in the manner prescribed
by this title, and every patent to lands within
this state duly executed and verified according
to law, from the time of filing the same with the
recorder for record, impart notice to all persons
of the contents thereof; and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lienholders shall be
deemed to purchase and take with notice."
In the annotation to the above section is found under
subdivision 5 the case of Crompton v. Jenson, 78 XJ. 55,
70,1 P. 2d 242 which holds as follows:
"One who deals with real property is charged
with notice of what is shown by the records of
the county recorder of the county in which the
real property is situated."
The county records as reflected by the abstract of
title (Ex. 4) at entries No. 40, 41, 42 and 43 set forth the
execution, the sheriff's certificate of sale and sheriff's
deed. The execution reflects that same was issued upon
a judgment of $22.80 and the sheriff's certificate of sale
and the sheriff's deed sets forth the nineteen lots, the
subject of this action, which were purchased at sheriff's
sale for $47.46.
I t is clearly evident from the above law and cases
that appellant Treadways were bound not by simply
that which appeared in the abstract of title but that
which appeared of record, and as heretofore pointed out
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the execution and Sheriff's Deed each recited a consideration as having been paid for 19 lots, of $47.46.
Attention of the Honorable Court is directed to the
fact that appellants Treadway willingly paid $1000.00
for two of the nineteen lots. Such valuation placed on
the property by these appellants themselves, appellants
must have assumed the whole of the property to be
worth not less than $8000.00, which property was procured for a mere pitance of $47.46. Such would have
put any person of common reason and prudence on
inquiry as to the regularity of the proceedings by which
the party from whom they were acquiring title came into
title. Not only this but it was evident that the property
had been sold enmasse, that more than enough property
had been sold than was necessary to satisfy the judgment, and that personalty was not exhausted before the
real property was levied upon and sold.
Recognizing weakness in the title, counsel for
Treadways did make some investigation as to the regularity of the proceedings leading up to the sale but
strangely, counsel went to the one who brought about
the irregularities instead of to the proper source. Is it
reasonable to expect that the one who must defend the
title would admit of irregularities 1
The editors of American Jurisprudence at Vol. 55,
page 1081, Sec. 703 say:
"In any event, the law does require reasonable diligence in ascertaining any defect of title,
and mere inconvenience will not excuse the failure to perform this duty. Moreover, the inquiry
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must be made at a reliable source from which
the true state of facts mil be naturally disclosed;
it is not sufficient that the purchaser make an
inquiry of a person when he knows that it is to
such person's interest to misrepresent or conceal the existence of the outstanding interest,
and that such person does deny its existence."
The Supreme Court of this state is committed to
the rule that where a recent and immediate grantor's
deed in a chain of title shows on its face that the grantor
paid a nominal consideration for the property being conveyed it puts the purchaser on notice, and he must
make an inquiry as to whether or not grantor had a
right to convey property and whether it was subject to
other unrecorded and outstanding interests.
See Lawley et al. vs. Hickenlooper et al., 61 TJ. 298,
212 Pac. 526.
Respondent is mindful of the fact that subsequent
to the Lawley vs. Hickenlooper case the Legislature has
passed a statute, Chapter 106, 1945 Session Laws, which
provides that a nominal consideration in the deed is no
longer notice of outstanding equitable interests.
In Pender v. Bird, (Utah) 224 P2d 1057 this court
had occassion to consider a transfer of title predicated
on a quit claim deed to property of considerable value
when a consideration of $25 was paid for the deed and
in which case Mr. Justice McDonough, speaking for the
court, said:
"The (recording) statute was not enacted
to protect one whose ignorance of the title is
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deliberate and intentional, nor does a mere nominal consideration satisfy the requirements that
a valuable consideration must be paid" (Itallics
added)
We believe it was not the intention of the legisture to make Chapter 106 applicable to those transfers in
which the instrument reflects and is intended to reflect
the actual consideration, such as a sheriff's deed. We
contend that the statute covers voluntary conveyances
in which actual consideration is not expressed and not
non-voluntary conveyances in which true consideration
is expressed.
In the case of Hart v. Parrish, 244 S.W. (2d) 105,
supra the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a subsequent grantee in the immediate chain of title was not
an innocent purchaser where the Sheriff's deed recited
a consideration of $37.50 and the property had a value of
$3500.00, the court said:
"When the deed of trust was executed August
23rd, 1948, defendant-appellant Mittler, beneficiary in the deed of trust, had constructive
notice of the sheriff's deed priorly recorded
August 20th, 1948, Sec. 442.390, E.S. 1949. The
recorded deed recited a consideration of $37.50.
The described proprty was admittedly of the
fair market value of $3500.00. Defendant, crossappellant Mittler had inspected the property
sometime in July 1948. He testified, 'I know
property when I see it.' Mittler testified he had
made the loan to plaintiffs on August 14th, at
which time he 'did not know who owned the
property.' He said: 'when you make a loan to
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a man who is a friend of yours you loan him
money of his face if necessary.' Appellant
Mittler testified he was depending on plaintiff
Hart's 'knowledge of the transaction,' and upon
Hart's judgment as to the title. Plaintiff was
familiar with the property and knew defendantrespondent Lillian Parrish, widow of Charles H.
Parrish, was in possession, 'living on the property'. In these circumstances it should not be
held Mittler had no notice of the sale upon which
defendant, Lillian Parrish, had relied for cancellation."
This appellant also argues as does appellant Dowse
that the sale was not void, but voidable only. We have
fully answered this argument under the Dowse section
of this brief.
Appellant Treadway takes the position that he
obtained from Dowse a better title and a stronger position as to respondent than Dowse enjoyed. This is not
the law for it has been repeatedly held that a judgment
creditor who purchases at his execution sale is not a
bona fide purchase, and that he is chargeable as a matter
of law with notice of all irregularities attending the
execution and sale.
Simons vs. Clark, 99 Pac. 739;
Hazelwood v. Jenkins, 205 Pac. 1038;
Kuehn v. Kuehn, 259 S.W. 290;
Anderson Buick Co. v. Cook, 110 P2d 857;
Tallyn v. Cowden, 290 Pac. 1005;
Badin v. Henry McCleary Timber Co., 289;
Pac. 1016;
Bradt v. Beloit Dary Co., 230 N.W. 135.
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Thus it follows as a corollary to this doctrine that
one taking title through a judgment creditor who
purchased at the execution sale is not a bona fide
purchaser. In support of this position we cite 33 C.J.S.
Sec. 296 at page 589 reading as follows:
"Purchasers from judgment creditor. If a
judgment creditor purchasing at an execution
sale is not regarded as a bona fide purchaser,
(Sec. 295), a party claiming under such judgment
creditor is not an innocent purchaser, and acquires no better title than that of the judgment
creditor, at least where he has notice of facts
placing him on inquiry."
The record affecting the property being purchasd
by appellants Treadwavs did disclose the amount of
property acquired at sheriff's sale, the price for which
it was acquired and the fact that the property was not
contiguous and further the fact that more than enough
property to satisfy the amount of the judgment was
sold under execution.
SPECIAL WABBANTY DEED
It is further respondent's contention that appellants
Tread way were not bona fide purchasers without notice,
this inasmuch as tEese appellants accepted a special
warranty deed and did not insist on a general warranty
deed. The special warranty deed put Treadways on
notice of the fact that appellant Dowse was conveying
only such right, title and interest as he himself had in
and to the premises. The special warranty deed was
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accepted notwithstanding the fact that appellant Dowse
had agreed to convey the property to Treadways by a ^
general warranty deed.
Although the authorities are not in harmony, the
general rule appears to be that where a grantor gives a
special warranty deed conveying all his right, title and
interest it puts the purchaser on notice of infirmities
in the title, this is especially true under the circumstances
of this case.
In QQ C J . at page 1098 the law is stated as follows:
"A purchaser need not claim under a general
warranty deed to entitle him to the defense of
bona fide purchaser, if the deed purports to
convey the land itself and not merely the
grantor's title or interest therein, and the fact
that it contains a limited or special warranty, or
no waranty at all, cannot of itself impute notice
of prior or lateral equities, so as to preclude one
claiming under such a deed from being a bona
fide purchaser, although, on the other hand, it
has beeen held that a deed with only a special
covenant of warranty raises a presumption of
knowledge by the grantee that the title is defective. But one who takes property under a deed
containing an express exclusion of warranty of
title, and as to which there is a complete chain
of title, to another on record, is not a bona fide
purchaser." (Itallics added).
Thus it appears that that which the record title
reflected, namely, that the gross lack of consideration,
sale enmasse of 19 lots which consisted of three separate
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parcels, more than sufficient property sold than necessary to satisfy the judgment, the sheriff's return failing
to show that personalty was exhausted before levying
upon the real property, the excessive levy and the
failure of appellant Dowse to convey title by a general
~ warranty deed as he had agreed, most certainly placed
Treadways on notice of irregularities and defects and
he cannot now claim to be a bona fide purchaser.
Having made an investigation and having recognized
infirmities, inadequacy of price and irregularities,
these appellants cannot now say they were innocent purchasers for value.
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANT WHITAKER'S
BRIEF
A complete answer to the arguments and contentions
of appellant Whitaker is heretofore set forth.
It should be remembered that appellants Whitaker
and Dowse were close friends and had been for a long
period of time, that they visited each other at least once
each week, that they had had numerous business transactions, both prior to the time the mortgage was placed
on the corner lots and subsequent thereto. That at the
time the mortgage was given and When the foreclosure
thereof was instituted they were jointly interested in
several properties in Salt Lake County.
The fact that appellant Dowse permitted the interest
on the mortgage to become delinquent and to permit
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the foreclosure of the mortgage covering the corner lot
which has a value without contradiction of at least $6,000.00 as was testified to by Mr. LeCheminant, risking
the total loss of the property mortgaged, without any apparent effort on the part of appellant Dowse to so much
as pay the interest is the clearest evidence of collusion
on the part of Dowse and Whitaker.
It is further evident that as a part of the connivance
they obtained title insurance on the property in an
amount necessary to cover the mortgage. This of course
does not excuse the title company for having issued the
policy in the face of all that appeared of record, but it
does go to show that it is all part of a well planned
scheme of these two appellants to protect their every
move in the transaction.
It is further clearly evident that little time was lost
by appellant Dowse in placing a mortgage on the corner
property after having acquired the sheriff's deed thereto.
Does Mr. Whitaker expect the court to believe if this were
a bona fide transaction in all respects that Mr. Dowse
would permit a foreclosure of the mortgage to be entered
when but two interest installments were due and owing
thereon? In such cases where fraud is so apparent, the
trial court was not bound by that which appeared on the
record alone but it is within the discretionary power of
the court to look behind the evidence and to determine
that which is at the very foundation of the fraudulent ^
acts of the parties. ?
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This appellant in setting out the status of the title
to the nineteen lots executed upon, urges on this court
as he did in the trial court that Lots 13 to 21, Block 8,
were subject to a lien of judgment in favor of Carl Morandi for $3,086.44 (Ex. C). It is evident that no money
judgment lien stood against respondent in favor of Carl
Morandi as appellant would have this court believe,
but the same was a judgment in favor of respondent and
against Morandi quieting title in respondent to certain
property therein described, subject to the payment by
respondent to Morandi of taxes, interest, penalty and
costs in the sum of $3,086.44. Judge Neely, counsel for
Morandi, testified to the fact that it was never intended
that a judgment be entered against respondent in favor
of Morandi. By this same kind of argument at the trial
of the case appellant attempted to depreciate the value
of respondent's interest in the properties executed upon
and sold at sheriff's sale.
The evidence in this case very clearly shows that
appellant Whitaker is not a bona fide mortgagee for value
without notice of title defects, but on the contrary it is
evident that this appellant was a party to the fraud perpetrated on respondent.

STABILITY OF LAND TITLE DEEIVED
THEOUGH JUDICIAL PEOCESS
It is believed the case of Dunn v. Ponceler, 193 So.
723, 236 Ala. 53, completely answers the appellant's
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argument that the stability and marketability of real
property requires a reversal of the trial court's decision.
In the Dunn case the court said:
"What was said by Brickell, C. J., in Ray's
Adm'r. v. Womble, Supra, is here pertinent and
settles this question adversely to the contention
of appellant. 'While it is the policy of the law
to protect purchasers at judicial sales and to
inspire confidence in their validity, it is equally
its policy to prevent such sales from being perpetrated into instrumntalities of oppression and
confiscation of men's estates. It was the clear
duty of the sheriff in which he would have been
fully protected, to have postponed the sale,
returning the execution, stating the facts and that
the lands had not been sold for want of bidders.'
Powell v. Governor, 9 Ala. 36; Lankford v. Jackson, 21 Ala. 650; Henderson vs. Sublett, 21 Ala.
626. The sale, under the facts appearing in the
record were mere spoliation and not the execution of the process of the court. There can be
no hesitancy in pronouncing it invalid and decreeing its vacation and a cancellation of the deed
of the sheriff."

CROSS-APPEAL
(1) The court erred in awarding punitive damages
in the sum of $500.00 only in respondent's claim for
slander of title.
(2) The court erred in allowing respondent the sum
of $1,000.00 attorney's fee only under his claim for
slander of title.
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AKGUMENT
The court having found that the appellant Dowse
had executed upon and sold respondent's property upon
a satisfied judgment, it decreed a judgment slander of
title holding that appellant Dowse had intentionally and
maliciously slandered respondent's title to his property.
For this the court awarded but the sum of $500.00 punitive damages and $1,000.00 attorney's fees.
We submit that under the circumstances of this case
that the punitive damages awarded should have been
not less than $2500.00.
The uncontradicted evidence was that a reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in this action for slander of
title was $1500.00, however the trial court awarded only
the sum of $1,000.00.
Eespondent therefore respectfully submits that the
trial court erred in setting punitive damages in the sum
of $500.00 and attorneys' fees in the sum of $1,000.00
and respondent respectfully requests that this court
enter a mandate requiring the trial court to enter punitive and exemplary damages in the sum of $2500.00 and
attorneys' fees in the sum of $1500.00 in the slander
of title of respondent.
WHEKEFORE, respondent respectfully submits:
That the judgment of the trial court vacating and
setting aside the sheriff's deed to the appellant Dowse
and the deed of the appellant Dowse to the appellant's
Treadfway and the mortgage be sustained and that a
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mandate be issued from this court ordering the trial
court to modify the judgment in the slander of title action
setting the respondent's punitive and exemplary damages in the sum of $2500.00 and $1500.00 attorneys' fees.

Respectfully submitted,

L. DELOS DAINES,
MILTON V. BACKMAN of
Backman, Backman & Clark,
Attorneys for Respondent
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